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
UNITED STATES

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

(S) the Court issued orders authorizing the installation and use of On pen register and trap and trace devices as requested by the government in the abovecaptioned docket. In accordance with the government's Verified Memorandum of Law Regarding the Collection of Post-Cut-Through Digits Through Telephone Pen Register Surveillance Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which it filed with the (S)Court or hereafter "Memorandum"), the government's application explicitly requested authority to record or decode post-cutthrough digits. Application, at 9-10. Also in accordance with the Memorandum, the government undertook not to make any affirmative investigative use, through pen register authorization, of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, and added for the first time in an application to this Court: "except in rare cases in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious



August 20, 2018, Public Release

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physical injury, or harm to the national security." Id, at 10. The Court's Order directs			
the government to notify this Court "of any such affirmative use and explain the reasons			
therefore." Order, at 5. The relevant orders and authorities will expire on (S)	1		
The Memorandum indicates that, in some cases, post-cut-through digits, i.e., digits	T		
dialed from a targeted telephone number after the initial call set-up is completed or "cut			
through," may constitute call content; for example, when a caller connects to a			
and enters a number. Memorandum, at 1-2. (S)			
Under existing telephone pen register orders, some service providers supply the	1		
government with all post-cut-through digits. Id., at 4. Collecting this information is			
necessary to determine the call identifying information, because in many instances, the	i .		
targeted telephone number places credit card, calling card or collect calls by first dialing			
a carrier access number, then, after this initial call is connected, dialing the phone number			
of the destination party. Id., at 5.	b1		
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	,		
The current definition of "pen register" authorizes the	l.		
	the government to notify this Court "of any such affirmative use and explain the reasons therefore." Order, at 5. The relevant orders and authorities will expire or (5) (5) The Memorandum indicates that, in some cases, post-cut-through digits, i.e., digits dialed from a targeted telephone number after the initial call set-up is completed or "cut through," may constitute call content; for example, when a caller connects to a and enters number. Memorandum, at 1-2. Under existing telephone pen register orders, some service providers supply the government with all post-cut-through digits. Id., at 4. Collecting this information is necessary to determine the call identifying information, because in many instances, the targeted telephone number places credit card, calling card or collect calls by first dialing a carrier access number, then, after this initial call is connected, dialing the phone number of the destination party. Id., at 5. (5)		

government to collect dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, but expressly

¹ The government provided an oral briefing to the Honorable Michael J. Davis (then a Judge of the FISC) regarding the FBI's procedures for avoiding the collection and investigative use of content in the operation of pen registers and trap and trace devices "several months" prior to submitting its Memorandum. Memorandum, at 12. The subject of this oral briefing was FBI guidance that was issued to all field offices

 (S) on n response to a Memorandum from former Deputy Attorney General, Larry D. Thompson, dated outlining the Department of Justice policy on the collection of post-cutthrough digits through criminal pen registers. Id. Both of these documents were attached to the government's Memorandum o



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provides "that such information shall not include the contents of any communication...."² 50 U.S.C. §1841(2) (incorporating by reference the definition in 18 U.S.C. §3127(3)). Accordingly, the government in its Memorandum undertakes to impose the restriction in all applications and proposed orders subsequently filed with this Court that the government will make no affirmative investigative use, through pen register authorization, of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, except in a rare case in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury, or harm to the national security. Memorandum, at 12-13.

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	t.			
In light of the foregoing, the government is ordered to submit a report, under oath				
and no later than This report shall include: (S)				
(1) An explanation of how the government is implementing its obligation to make				
no affirmative investigative use, through pen register authorization, of post-cut-	1			
through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling				
information, except in a rare case in order to prevent an immediate danger of	:			
death, serious physical injury, or harm to the national security, addressing in				
particular:				
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 (a) whether post-cut-through digits obtained via FISA pen register surveillance are uploaded into
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(b) if so, what procedures are in place to ensure that no affirmative investigative use is made of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, including whether such procedures mandate that this information be deleted from the relevant system.

(2) An explanation of what procedures are in place to ensure that the Court is notified, as required pursuant to the Court's Order in the above captioned matter, whenever the government decides to make affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information in order to prevent an immediate danger of death, serious physical injury, or harm to the national security.

SO ORDERED, thi S

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY Judge, United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

I, Karen E. Sutton, Clerk, FISC, certify that this document 's a irue and correct copy of the original.

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