

## U.S. Department of Justice

## Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

July 17, 2020

The Honorable Lindsey Graham Chairman Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Ranking Member Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Marco Rubio Acting Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mark Warner Ranking Member Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

We write in further regard to matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and other matters contained in the December 9, 2019 report by Department of Justice (Department) Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

As we described in our letter of February 7, 2020, the Attorney General has determined that it is now in the public interest to release to Congress additional documents and information related to these matters to the extent consistent with national security interests and with the January 7, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). We began to provide such documents to you on February 7. A twelfth production is enclosed herein, Bates numbered SENATE-FISA2020-001106 to SENATE-FISA2020-001167. This submission contains a February 9, 2017 Electronic Communication and an annotated New York Times news article. The attached production is unclassified in its current format.

Pursuant to longstanding Department policy, the Department has made redactions relating to certain personally identifiable information or to ongoing investigations, enforcement activities, and certain law enforcement operations, methods, or techniques.

Today's submission, along with forthcoming productions of additional documents, is based on extraordinary and unique circumstances, and should not be construed as precedent setting in any regard. The production of these materials does not waive any applicable privilege.

The Honorable Lindsey Graham The Honorable Dianne Feinstein The Honorable Marco Rubio The Honorable Mark Warner Page 2

We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Stephen E. Boyd

Assistant Attorney General

Enclosures



# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

### **Electronic Communication**

Title: Interview	of Primary Subsource	Date:	02/09/201
From: -CD1 Contact:			
Approved By:			
Drafted By:			
Synopsis: Interviewed for three day interview.	CROSSFIRE FOREIGN AGENTS REGIS RUSSIA; SENSITIVE INVESTIGAT DRAGON FOREIGN AGENTS REGIS RUSSIA; SENSITIVE INVESTIGAT CROSSFIRE FOREIGN AGENTS REGIS SENSITIVE INVESTIGAT iew of primary Subsource s, this is a consolidated with the sensitive investigated.	TRATION A  IVE MATTE TRATION A  IVE MATTE FURY TRATION A  IVE MATTE	CT -  R  CT -  R  CT-RUSSIA;  R
Reason: 1.4(c)			
Sou	ived From: Multiple rces		
Dec	lassify On: 20421231		
Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016			
Enclosure(s): Enclosed and I. Info from Prima Substitute.  1. (U) Proffer Agreement			

Details:

Declassified by FBI - C58W88B61 on 7/16/2020 This redacted version only

During the course of three days, Primary Subsource

was interviewed in the FBI's Washington's Field office (WFO) by FBI

personnel along with attorneys from the US Department of Justice,

National Security Division. Primary
Subsource Below is a consolidated write-up of the

three days of interviews.

#### 24 January 2017 (1330 - 1700)

#### FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

#### Present:

Primary Subsource , interviewee

Primary Subsource's , interviewee's attorney
Attorney

FBI Agent , FBI Special Agent

FBI SIA , FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

, Chief, National Security Division, US Department of

# I. Primary Background Subsource

(U//FOUO) Primary was born in the SIA city SIA on SIA

He describes his family as SIA which included SIA

and SIA . Primary completed his high school course in SIA in

SIA . He indicated that his SIA is probably tied

Interview of Primary Subsource Title: Re: , 02/09/2017 to the fact that SIA was a SIA city. During his high school years, for SIA he traveled to the SIA and was also an SIA SIA he attended a high . In SIA school in SIA , he also spent some weeks in SIA which at that time was SIA (U//FOUO) For university, Primary attended SIA at which time he graduated with a degree SIA between SIA Primary began work during and after college with a number of Russian . He worked for SIA SIA . While with SIA , he made friends with a number of individual in the field of SIA He was also SIA , during company, employed by a which time he traveled SIA . Also, during and immediately after his , he traveled SIA time at SIA with an SIA and served as a facilitator. The SIA is associated with the Library of Congress, and during SIA , he assisted and traveled with the delegation SIA other cities in the SIA (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource desire had always been to obtain a graduate degree in the United States. He applied to a number of schools, and received the best - and one of the only - offers from the SIA . He said that his choice of SIA didn't involve SIA , but it just happened that the school gave him a full fellowship for his SIA studies in and wanted to stay and . He graduated from SIA work in the SIA , with the hope of getting his Ph.D. He eventually was accepted not to a SIA but to SIA

program with a focus on SIA and SIA (as he described it, SIA after his time at SIA "). During ar Primary in varying ranks worked at the Subsource SIA . He worked on research projects for SIA [ANALYST NOTE: Later in the debriefing, attorney asked if we'd all heard about Primary Subsource work on Primary Subsource We indicated that we uncovering had, and that it was our understanding that he had done that work with Primary Subsource confirmed that.] (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that he soon hit a glass ceiling at because of his SIA and his lack of a SIA time, he was also SIA , who was SIA and was noted as SIA on his SIA He left<mark>SIA</mark> circaSIA , stayed SIA SIA and began to try his hand at independent consulting. For a time, he did various analytical pieces on with SIA . In time, some of the work moved into the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Primary Subsource says that he saw opportunities to use his existing network of friends and colleagues in the United States and Russia - e.g. high school SIA began work for SIA again doing research and analysis and due diligence work. At SIA , he served as the SIA , which meant that he directed others in doing business intelligence on various topics/sub-regions, including SIA . He helped analysts under him figure out how to best handle assignments and talk to clients. He also put together weekly, bi-weekly and monthly reports. Primary worked for

Title: Interview of Re: , 02/09/2017

SIA through the summer of SIA , at which time SIA parent company went bankrupt and SIA .

(U//FOUO) rumary Subsource described his travel to up through the SIA period as sporadic and personal. He took a trip back to during SIA in order to do research for his SIA . The rest of his trips SIA during this time - which he said took place every years or so - were centered on SIA ,SIA and celebrating New Year's.

# II. Primary Subsource Early Relationship and Eventual Employment with Christopher Steele and Orbis Business Intelligence

(U//FOUO) Primary first met Christopher Steele [hereafter Steele] in the mid-to-late SIA . The introduction was brokered through with Steele's , who, according to . In the period that was looking for work, following the end of his tenure at SIA SIA was involved with helping to try and find new employment opportunities. SIA found out that Steele was setting up a new business, Orbis, and that he was on the lookout for analytical help. SIA suggested that Primary Subsource might consider looking at Orbis, and helped to broker an email introduction to Steele. According to Primary Subsource this was just one of the companies helped to broker introductions.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource met in person with Steele at a Starbucks in

. They met for about an hour in the coffee shop, and then went to Steele's hotel, where they sat and talked for about 30 minutes.

Primary Subsource said that they really didn't talk in-depth about Primary Subsource background, but rather discussed Primary Subsource basic biographical

information, his contacts/network, and his connections in SIA. No work was offered at this time, but Steele said that "If we [Orbis] get a project, we'll get in touch."

and asked that he fulfill a project - an open source analysis of what thought were three of the best sectors of low-risk investment between the primary Subsource wrote a few pages, highlighting risks and opportunities, and submitted them to Steele. Primary Subsource still wasn't sure at this time what Orbis' primary focus was - he primary Subsource said that it was not clear if it was about due diligence and business intelligence. For the short risk assessment report, Primary Subsource was paid a few hundred dollars, direct-deposited into his account. He said he was very appreciative of this, because he didn't really have an income at this time.

(U//FOUO) Later in SIA, Steele told him that he had read and liked his Primary Subsource was formally brought on board with Orbis. risk assessment and He signed a confidentiality agreement, which he didn't think twice about signing because it was fairly standard - he compared it to the types of paperwork he signed at SIA , including sexual harassment policy, etc. All contact with Steele was being done at this time via email and Skype. Primary Subsource signed the confidentiality agreement, scanned it, and sent it back to Steele via email. Primary Subsource did not sign a "non-compete" agreement with Orbis, and he described his work projects" as he was still work" and " with Orbis initially as " with SIA . Orbis was just part of his overall portfolio at this time.

(U//FOUO) Initially, his work with Orbis was in the open source sphere.

Title: Interview of Re: , 02/09/2017

He did not have any visibility into Orbis' end clients. Primary Subsource commented that during his time with Orbis, he has always been trying to understand the tangible results of his work - Primary Subsource attorney added that his client, "never asked, and was never told [about final clients]." The project requirements were always kept vague with few concrete parameters - e.g. "Can you do some checking on this?" Also, initially with Orbis, his sole contact was with Steele. He was in email and Skype communication with Steele and was informally introduced to other Orbis employees during Skype calls, but Primary Subsource was never flown out to the UK to meet with Steele and the Orbis team.

His specific project involved inquires about a [which Primary Subsource] did not name] and the company's owner, which he described as a former Russian senator and Duma deputy. It was a due diligence assignment, and he was meant to look for company/management links to organized crime and Russia's regional and federal power structures. For this, he was wired \$3,000. He used \$1,500 to purchase a round-trip ticket, and \$1,500 to cover expenses for the trip. He used his existing contacts and daisy-chained from them to try to identify others with relevant information. For example, Primary Subsource explained, he would use pre-existing contacts to find out if anyone he knew had worked in public relations or advertising for a .

Primary Subsource did not pay anyone for information, and reported back to Steele verbally either via Skype or in-person in London.

(U//FOUO) In circa SIA , Primary Subsource traveled for the SIA in his life . It was both a personal trip and a business trip. Orbis paid for the trip, and during his time in the UK, Primary Subsource met Steele - "for the second or third time in my life" - and

Title: Interview of Re: , 02/09/2017

also introduced to other Orbis employees, including and and about whom primary Subsource described as an analyst who had graduated from an English university. Primary Subsource described the time with Orbis as "general meetings, [pitching] potential projects, and discussing general rumors about Putin and Putin's new third term as president. There was talk about what the "biggest rumors" or the "biggest compromising info" regarding the Russian government was.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource could not remember exactly when he had first learned that Steele was a former intelligence officer. He thought it was around 2012 or 2013. He couldn't remember if someone told him that fact, someone mentioned it, or if it was just "common knowledge" that he had picked up over time. [ANALYST NOTE: In discussing his knowledge of Steele's former intelligence service employment, Primary Subsource remarked that he didn't really care to know such things and wanted to "stay out of the government's business" - to which his attorney said, "Well, you haven't done a very good job of that."]

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource continued to work on a number of projects for Orbis on all kinds of subjects, including Russian leadership, banking, and the SIA . He would provide reports every month or every other month.

contractual relationship, and it was Primary Subsource hope that SIA

SIA would result in SIA and

Primary Subsource eventual ability to get a security clearance and set up his own business. However, with the SIA bankruptcy of SIA

parent company - and the subsequent closing of SIA itself 
Primary Subsource found himself in a difficult situation, SIA . He

needed an entity to SIA - and as Orbis couldn't do it [as Primary Subsource attorney put it, because Orbis was a went to a friend, SIA British company] the SIA was receptive about bringing Primary Subsource on board with SIA that they could only help him out if he had a source of income. At that point, Primary Subsource introduced Steele and SIA and a formal arrangement was set up between Orbis and SIA served as the "contract vehicle" through which would be paid a monthly salary for his work for Orbis. became a salaried hisSIA employee of SIA and SIA SIA . Out of the approximately SIA people employed atSA Primary Subsource was the only one - as far as he knows - who was working solely for Orbis, and Primary Subsource believes that only SIA his work for Orbis. Prior to this arrangement, the only paperwork tie mmany Subsource and Orbis was through the banking/wire transactions, but after this, the only regular paperwork tie would be between Primary Subsource said that he received after and SIA deductions, etc. about SIA in cash/month. [ANALYST NOTE: also gave a figure of SIA /month, but is not clear how much SIA charges Orbis for Primary Subsource services, which would indicate the makes from Primary Subsource Orbis-related work.] Since many Subsource is on a monthly salary with SIA , Steele can reach out directly, give assignments and direct his Primary Subsource travel. III. Primary Subsource Policies and Procedures While Traveling Abroad for Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security Orbis; Services was asked how he "covers" his queries with his (U//FOUO)

sources. He typically tells his sources that he is working on a research project or an analytical product. He was also asked if there were friends, associates and/or sources who knew that he was collecting information for Orbis. He said "yes and no," and explained that some of his closer friends understand that he works in the area of due diligence and business intelligence. Many of them think that he is doing projects for entities like SIA , the SIA , or think tanks SIA .

They don't know that he works for Orbis, as he signed a non-disclosure agreement and told not to talk about the company. He has never mentioned Chris Steele or Orbis to his friends and associates. He emphasized that "you [the FBI] are the first people he's told."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked if he takes notes on the information he is collecting from his sources, or if he keeps any kind of records. He was told by Steele that it is a security risk to take notes; he hasn't kept notes or electronic records. He occasionally makes scribbles and/or chicken scratch notes here and there, but gives verbal debriefs in SIA following his trips SIA . Altogether, with respect to the election-related reporting, he had three trips SIA . He also had one additional United Kingdom trip. While SIA , he was primarily SIA

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource had no communications with Steele while SIA.

He was always advised by Steele that they were not to have communications, or to minimize communications, saving them for only emergency or urgent matters.

(U//FOUO) During the conversation about Source 1 [see below], primary Subsource was asked if Orbis had ever asked him to broker direct contact with one of his Primary Subsource sources, or whether Orbis was comfortable keeping primary Subsource as the intermediary between the sources and the company. Primary Subsource indicated that Orbis has always kept him Primary Subsource as the intermediary.

(U//FOUO) rimary Subsource indicated that, to his knowledge, he has not had any contacts with the Russian intelligence or security services. [ANALY ST NOTE: His attorney emphasized "to his knowledge" during this part of the discussion.] rimary Subsource said that he had contacts with Russian government officials SIA , as he said, in the SIA – but he denied any contact – again, "as far as he rimary Subsource knew," with anyone in the SVR, GRU or FSB.

## IV. Primary Subsource Initial US Election-Related Assignments for Orbis

(U//FOUO) Around March 2016, Primary Subsource and Chris Steele had a voice conversation during which time Steele asked Primary Subsource to see what he Primary Subsource could find out about Paul Manafort, including his reputation in the United States, his connections to the Yanukovich regime in Ukraine, and any corruption ties. He related some of Steele's collection-related questions - "Do you know [about] Manafort? Find out about Manafort's dealings with Ukraine, his dealings with other countries, and any corrupt schemes [to which Manafort is connected]."

\*\*Timary Subsource\*\* said that he was "clueless" about who Manafort was, and that this was a "strange task" to have been given. It was strange because had not done US-related projects for Orbis before, and he was a bit uncomfortable working on a topic dealing with SIA

Steele did not give him a tight deadline on this assignment. At this

point, Primary Subsource was on salary with Orbis through SIA , and there was no difference in financial remuneration for this assignment. He had no inclinations as to why, or for whom, Steele was asking about Manafort. Primary Subsource carefully asked around some of his SIA friends. He said he may have asked friends and contacts in Russia, but he couldn't remember off-hand. He added that, for this topic, his friends and contacts in Russia couldn't say very much because they were "too far removed" from the matter. Primary Subsource recalled that he was able to find articles about Manafort's ties to Ukraine and the Philippines.

Primary Subsource reported some of the findings on this assignment to Steele using SIA , a secure messenger app, which he has used, in addition to Skype, for communicating with Steele.

(U//FOUO) In the last week of SIA an Orbis-related trip SIA . He was working primarily on a business intelligence matter - aSIA . For this trip, Chris also asked Primary Subsource to look for information dealing with the US presidential election, including compromising materials on Donald Trump. said he could not remember if Steele had asked Primary Subsource to ask around for compromising materials on just Trump, or Trump and Hillary Clinton - at which point Primary Subsource attorney indicated that him [the attorney] previously that it had been both presidential candidates. The request did not shock Primary Subsource, but it was - again outside the normal scope of work and it wasn't completely comfortable for him. Like the Manafort assignment, it was not really a Russia-specific job and it involved, indirectly, his SIA ." He was nervous and cautious when asking around about the topic in Russia, but he felt like he had to report something back to Steele about it. Steele did not place any higher priority on the

SIA

It was, to Primary Subsource, "unpleasant," but he made inquiries and had a few election-related conversations, but it wasn't the main focus of his trip.

Contacts on his (U//FOUO) Source 2 Source 2 is in SIA , probably (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource has known Source 2 for about SIA around years. They first met at a SIA . They were together at the<mark>SIA</mark> and struck SIA it off well. He is now a good friend. Source 2 comes from a and, more distantly, Source 2 himself is a SIA and a SIA . He runs his own Facebook page, and has served as SIA of two different SIA SIA . He is SIA . He has been Primary Subsource source of information regarding economic sanctions, and actions taken by SIA - a friend of Source 2 knows a SIA handling the company's public and governmental relations (PR/GR). Another of Source 2 close friends works as a SIA Source 2 is an avid SIA often tries to monetize his relationship with Primary Subsource, suggesting that the two of them should try and do projects together for money. that there was compromising material on Trump. (U//FOUO) Source 3

(U//FOUO) Source 3 was born in SIA . She is a close,
personal friend to Primary Subsource . She is originally from SIA , and then
. They have been friends since [the equivalent
of] the 8 <sup>th</sup> grade SIA - SIA . Upon reflection,
Primary Subsource corrected himself, indicating that she had been a year behind
him in the SIA . She moved SIA in
SIA , where she worked in the SIA field. She did a bit of
SIA , worked in SIA , and alsoSIA
She went to the SIA [ANALYST NOTE.
what is now called SIA , where she took
SIA as her first language, SIA as her second language, and also
studied SIA . Pnmary Subsource added that Source 3 family has a vacation
home in SIA . Source 3 worked for SIA , SIA
In the
, Source 3 moved to SIA , where she served as SIA
. For about a year now, Source 3 has lived
in SIA . Primary Subsource said that he was not exactly sure what
she does now in SIA , but she has done SIA and
worksSIA a Russian SIA
(U//FOUO) Source 3 and Primary Subsource have remained friends for many years.
Her SIA helped him financially years ago - he would borrow money
from her SIA , and her SIA wouldn't ask for repayment. More
recently, he has helped out Source 3 financially - probably around
SIA over the last SIA years.
(U//FOUO)Source 3 has a vast network of people who are employed in the
SIA . Through
Source 3 SIA , Primary Subsource has been able to collect

information for Orbis across a wide range of topics - major Russian firms; Russian state entities, including the Kremlin. Source 3 "big connection" - though Primary Subsource emphasized that it is not necessarily her direct contact - is SIA Source 3 may have met him in person, but she knows a couple of SIA who have good access to and upon whom SIA has relied to get out his own messaging. wasn't sure, but he thought these contacts may include SIA met while he was at SIA and who used to head (U//FOUO) Through Source 3 has also become good friends with the SIA who was assaulted in Russia for SIA (U//FOUO) Source 3 is one of the individuals who knows that Primary Subsource works for due diligence and business intelligence. [As an aside at this point, Primary Subsource insisted that Source 2 probably has a better idea about this than does Source 3 because Source 2 is always trying to monetize his relationship with Primary Subsource Primary Subsource reiterated again to the interviewers that Source will often pitch money-making ideas or projects - "Let's work together. I Source 2 can try and get SIA answer a question, but I'll need some money to do it." | Source 3 has an understanding that Primary Subsource is "connected." In fact, either SIA Source 3 reached out to Primary Subsource and asked him morning or SIA morning, on how SIA for help in SIA living in the United States are viewing the Trump administration. She is asking him by the weekend, probably so she can sell it to a friend in Moscow.

Interview of Primary Subsource 02/09/201 (U//FOUO) Source 3 was one of the key sources for the "Trump dossier." She is directly quoted at points; however, Primary Subsource is not sure if she realizes that the quotations come from her. Right now, SIA . She is keeping<mark>SIA</mark> with her Source 3 used to work in the country of SIA (U//FOUO) Source 4 . He is **SIA** (U//FOUO) Source 4 is a SIA Primary Subsource met him while he was on an exchange scholar program at SIA in SIA for about SIA during Source 4 spent a lot of time with Source 4 time in SIA (U//FOUO) Source 4 specializes in regional politics, particularly , but also addresses US-Russian relations, US elections, and a host of issues involving US-Russian competition and conflict, including SIA (U//FOUO) Source 4 everyday job duties as a SIA for a visiting SIA vary. One day, he could be SIA ; the next day, he could be SIA a large group of while the next, he could be handling SIA . At SIA , he also has contact with friends and associates in the SIA As <del>imary Subsource</del> explained, it would not be uncommon for **Source 4** to remark to Primary Subsource things like, "I just heard such-and-such from someone in the

Interview of Primary Subsource Title: , 02/09/2017 Re: ," or "I just heard this from a Deputy Minister," or "I just overheard such-and-such about an issue." (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource and Source 4 drink heavily together, and Source 4 always looks forward to getting together with Source 4 when knows that Source 4 in town. (U//FOUO) Source 1 mary Subsource has known Source 1 since late SIA (U//FOUO) , when Source 1 was part of a SIA and SIA . He has visited both SIA as part of is about <sup>SIA</sup> visits to the United States. Source 1 years old and comes from SIA where he served in city and regional government positions, including SIA explained that things did not work out well for , so he moved to SIA and began working in the SIA - particularly with respect to SIA . From the SIA Source 1 worked for SIA . Over the last few years, he had served in the capacity of SIA (U//FOUO) Source 1 background as a former SIA means that, from a young age, he has been involved in political activities. He's been in some form of politics since he was a teenager. He is also a SIA but could not recall if it was in economics, political science or mary Subsource has been taking politics with Source 1 since his philosophy. Primary Subsource days as a SIA Primary Subsource goes to SIA Now, they meet together whenever

(U//FOUO) Orbis knows more about Source 1 because, as a favor to many Subsource reached out to Orbis to see if Orbis could help get Source 1 a scholarship for language courses in the asked Primary Subsource for assistance, and Primary Subsource United Kingdom. Source 1 turned to Orbis for help. As part of this, explained who Source 1 was, and why he Primary Subsource was asking Orbis for assistance. (U//FOUO) Source 1 is always trying to get Primary Subsource to start projects and make money together - Primary Subsource related how Source 1 , like others, is always asking questions like, "Can you get us some projects?" or "Can you get us financing?" or "Let's do something together dealing mary Subsource doesn't consider this as his source "tasking him" but as simply the normal course and scope of networking Primary Subsource did help Source 1 with an academic book in these circles. about SIA made about SIA for his assistance with the academic book. For it, went to the Library of Congress, performed archival research, and also talked to academics he Primary Subsource rimary Subsource knows that Source 1 travels to the SIA (U//FOUO) Source 1 has a good relationship with Russian Intelligence Officer (U//FOUO) Source 1 considers a good friend, and he Source 1 , many things about, and from, hears, from circles. From Source 1 relationship with Primary Subsource has been able to collect information of interest to Orbis, including Russian domestic politics and more specialized subjects like SIA understands that Source 1 relationship stems from Source 1 tenure in SIA There, with had contacts with the regional Federal Security Service (FSB),

as well as with individuals in the SIA who were associated with politically-conservative and strongly Russian SIA circles. It was through these connections that Source 1 was introduced to was asked if Source 1 was a devout Orthodox believer - did not believe so, but thought that he might have been at one time.

 $(U//FOUO)^{Primary Subsource}$  has never met Russian intelligence officer , and said that he doesn't believe he's ever been in the same room as Russian intelligence officer .

(U//FOUO) Source 5

(U//FOUO) Source 5 is an <mark>SIA</mark> Subsource has met her in They have been person, and they are also connected through for about SIA years. They have many mutual SIA friends friends. She is tied to Russia's , and she has ties to the SIA , as well as ties to the Russian intelligence remarked that things have become and security services. and SIA "personal" between Source 5 because of stories that have been written [ANALYST NOTE: This may be a reference to the fact that in SIA . The Carter Page-Sechin meeting references in the "Trump dossier" would have been derived from Source 5

#### VI. Dossier Report Number 2016/95

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked  $\frac{\text{Primary Subsource}}{\text{This material was collected during the period where the}}$ 

election-related theme was still a "side project." The election-related material became a much more important project in the July-August 2016 period.

(U//FOUO) This report involves reporting from "Source E" - reporting which Primary Subsource ties, at least in part, to Source 6 related the story about his contact with Source 6 or July 2016 -SIA - he , a SIA reached out to USPER . He asked USPER journalist for SIA some of the same questions Orbis had tasked him with regarding Trump's Russian connections, and USPER put him in contact with another of his colleagues, USPER 2 USPER had Source 6 said that USPER 2 contact information, and that Source 6 rimary Subsource should speak. Source 6 was, according to was someone with whom rimary Subsource, someone with whom "they" SIA were talking. There meeting up with USPER 2 in person, but was even talk about it did not happen. (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource reached out to Source 6 via email twice. He never received a response from the first attempt, but after the second attempt, he received in circa late 2016 a very strange phone call from a Russian male who he believed to be Source 6 , but who never identified himself. The individual on the other end of the call never identified himself. The two of them talked for a bit, and the two of them tentatively agreed to meet in person in US City at the end Primary Subsource traveled with SIA of July. At the end of July, , but the meeting never took place and no one ever called Primary Subsource back. Altogether, he had only a single phone call with an individual he thought to be Source 6 . The call was either a cellular

call, or it was a communication through a phone app. Primary Subsource will look back at his phone to see if he can get caller information.

#### VII. Dossier Report Number 2016/94

(U//FOUO) This report involves the purported Carter Page meeting with Sechin, as well as the purported Carter Page meeting with Igor Diveykin. Primary Subsource indicated that the sourcing for this report derives from his Primary Subsource conversations with Source 5 (U//FOUO) As Primary Subsource recalls, Carter Page was one of 4-5 names that Primary Subsource . Carter Page, as Primary Subsource relates, had Steele provided to his meetings in Moscow in early July 2016 - either the  $\epsilon^{\text{th}}$  through the 8 th, or the 5<sup>th</sup> through the 6<sup>th</sup>. Source 5 that she had heard that Carter Page was going to meet with Sechin, and then later, in writing, Source 5 confirmed that the Page-Sechin meeting had Primary Subsource said that he would confirm the date, actually taken place. time and circumstances under which Source 5 confirmed to him Primary Subsource that the Page-Sechin meeting had taken place. He will check his phone, but he recalls that he received the confirmation from via text in September 2016 when he was at SIA was able to confirm that the Page-Sechin meeting took place through one of her contacts - SIA . Altogether, Primary Subsource summarized, Source 5 him about the Sechin-Page meeting, and then later confirmed via text that the meeting had taken place. (U//FOUO) Source 5 travels to the SIA




# VIII. Media Contact/Outreach to Subsource

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource received two media inquiries on the dossier. One was from a specialized journal, while the other was from . He has not responded to either inquiry

### 25 January 2017

#### FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

#### Present:



#### I. Recent Communication by Christopher Steele

 $(U//FOUO)^{\mbox{Primary Subsource}}$  reported that Christopher Steele had reached out to him today  $\mbox{SIA}$ . He has not replied, but is planning to do so either tonight or tomorrow. His plan is to simply say that he has been meeting with his  $\mbox{SIA}$ .

#### II. Documents

primary Subsource brought three documents for the interviewers. The (U//FOUO) first was the Russian-language text interaction between regarding the Sechin-Page meeting in July 2016. The second profiles for Source 2 were copies of SIA Source 1 and Source 4 Source 3 Source 5 with an belonging to Source 2 added picture of a SIA . The third document was a copied pastiche of a number of profiles, business cards and pictures, which will be explained in further detail below.

Source 5 and Primary Subsource, he explained that the date he had given yesterday was incorrect. The text interchange took place in SIA versus SIA, and it would have been during Primary Subsource visit to SIA immediately following his SIA trip SIA. He was in SIA when they had the interaction. Interviewers indicated that it would be translated, but Primary Subsource wanted to point out that the Russian initials [which, transliterated into English would be I.I.S.] stand for Igor Ivanovich Sechin.

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #2, these are pictures and profiles of the friends and associates in Primary Subsource network discussed the previous day. Primary Subsource attorney balked at the use of the term "network," stating that the preferred term was "social circle." One of the interviewers noted that Source 3 profile shows her as having studied at SIA

(U//FOUO) Regarding Document #3, the following information was provided:

Primary Subsource identified (U//FOUO) In the upper left hand corner, as the head of the Russian and has never had direct interaction He has never met with him, but Source 2 and have direct contact. Source 2 are on friendly terms. and (U//FOUO) Underneath photo is a business card from noted as Deputy Director, . Underneath that business card is what appears to be a Windows Outlook references to work in the same office, and may actually serve under which Primary Subsource said stood for SIA It was from and Primary Subsource heard about the fears and concerns among "[Dmitriy] Medvedev's people" about what the Kremlin was doing with respect to involvement in the US presidential election. how the Russian influence issue was considered an "open secret" and that he was hearing similar stories from other sources probably Source 3 (U//FOUO) Next to the Windows Outlook screenshot on there is a list of pricing with the title, translated from Russian as "collection banknote United States.doc." Primary Subsource attorney emphasized that he did not believe this represented anything Primary Subsource explained illegal or illicit on the part of his client. this in reference to Souce 2 and his interest in SIA . During Primary Subsource travel to he went to**SIA** and, while there, withdrew bank notes from

Interview of Primary Subsource Title: 02/09/201 a number of different bank ATMs SIA Primary Subsource brought those notes to Source 3 , who would exchange the Scottish bank notes for rubles - using the current exchange rate. As he remarked the previous day, Source 2 is an SIA and has been doing so for decades. The pricing list is a "wish list." [As an aside, identified another of Source 2 friends, SIA (U//FOUO) In the upper right hand corner, Primary Subsource identified Russian Government Employee . She is currently serving as the head cSIA , which is run by [ANALYST NOTE: This may be a misidentification. The head of ], who in turn is connected with Russian Government Employee . In her position, rimary Subsource said that he has not Russian Government Employe direct access to as a source for the reports, but that they are used good friends and that he has known her for at least SIA vears. Russian official Russian official III. , Veterans Pension System, and Dossier Report 2016/111, including Paragraph #5 (U//FOUO) Underneath the picture of is a business card belonging to Russian official identified on the card as SIA rimary Subsource has known Russian official for several years They were together SIA , during which time Primary Subsource recalls that he tried to get conversation SIA started about Ukraine and sanctions.

first said that he knows that Russian Official has been back in Russia since August 2016, but then thought a bit more and said, "maybe summer Aussian official as "not a direct source, but he does Subsource described appear in the [Trump] dossier." SIA . According to Primary Subsource Russian official is the only person he Primary Subsource knows SIA Primary Subsource believes that SIA positive about that. He recalls that they had a conversation later in spring 2016 during which time Russian official said that he Russian offical had "put in a word" and wondered if it had helped. They had a 5-10 minute chat [ ANALYST NOTE: It is unclear if it was the same spring 2016 conversation or a later conversation] during which time Russan office confided in Primary Subsource that he Russian official was getting tired of doing what he wasn't really supposed to be doing in his job - SIA - and that he Russian official didn't want Russia "exposed" in the US election. It was Primary Subsource understanding that Russian official was moving back to Russia and hoped for an SIA (U//FOUO) As an aside while talking about Russian official explained that since his time atSIA , he has maintained distance from diplomats at the Russian Embassy. He and USPER contact with a SIA secretary at the Embassy - a strange guy who was pestering them. They gave this individual open source information. identified this individual as Russian official rimary Subsource knew Russian official about SIA while Prmary Subsource was working at SIA Russian official asked for information about Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, and USPER recommended

that they keep him at a distance. Primary Subsource did talk to Russian official — he related to the interviewers that Russian official SIA

. [This was how, explained Primary Subsource, he picked up information about how the SIA — sometimes driving and sometimes flying — to deliver cash SIA — sometimes driving and sometimes the map sometime around 2007-2008.

(U//FOUO) Looking at Report 2016/111, Primary Subsource was asked about the report's use of the descriptor, "a trusted compatriot." - as in paragraph one, "Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016..." Primary Subsource was asked if he was the "trusted compatriot" in these reports. Primary Subsource said that it might be him, but that it could also be others. Primary Subsource attorney then jumped in, stating that the "literary device" used by Steele in the dossier was not consistent and not clear, so he wanted to be careful about matching that descriptor to his client. Primary Subsource said that, to the best of his knowledge, he is not sure if he was the only one working on this issue for Orbis [and therefore he is not clear if he is always the "trusted compatriot" mentioned in the documents].

(U//FOUO) Interviewers drew Primary Subsource attention to paragraph 5 of the same report, where Mikhail Kalugin [written as Kulagin] is mentioned.

Primary Subsource is not clear how this paragraph was put together. Primary Subsource indicated that no MFA official told him because of the election issue. About SIA

Primary Subsource knows that

SIA

Primary Subsource that SIA

Ralugin had described Bondarev as

"a bright young guy." Primary Subsource has no idea where the language in this paragraph regarding SIA being "clean in this regard" (with respect to knowledge and involvement in US election matters SIA).

#### IV. Dossier Report 2016/94

(U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraphs 1 and 2, interviewers went back over Primary Subsource explanations from the previous day, particularly the issue of whether Primary Subsource had heard from Source 5 that the Page-Sechin meeting was going to happen, that it had happened, or both. explained that he didn't recall who had told him that the meeting was going to happen - it might have been through Source 5 , but the more he thought, the more he believed it was from someone else, and he couldn't recall who. He reported the meeting to Steele in July, and then, in October, he received Source 5 text with the confirming information from someone SIA does not know the identity SIA executive. (U//FOUO) Regarding Paragraph 3 on Carter Page's meeting with Igor nimary Subsource said that this information came from Source 3 Divevkin,

Primary Subsource and Source 3 had a phone conversation, or maybe Skype, but remembers that it was a voice communication which lasted about 30 minutes. Primary Subsource said it was during the summer, because he remembers having the conversation while was at the public swimming pool SIA and "whatever" with SIA Source 3 was relating information that she was hearing from her sources - Primary Subsource did not ask her about the identities of these sources.

Primary Subsource could probably follow-up with Source 3 about the sources, but he explained that he has no reason to doubt Source 3. He trusts Source 3

(U//FOUO) On the Diveykin identification, this was the name her sources gave her. He was in the Domestic Policy entity and was one of the people in charge of US-Russia relations [ANALYST NOTE: Primary Subsource description was someone unclear here, because he added, "election-related stuff," but then went back to referring to it as "US-Russia relations." Source suggested that there was an attempt to masquerade things or craft a façade because "the folks who were in domestic policy were working external [foreign] policy, while the folks doing external were working domestic matters."

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that, on the whole, his conversations with Source 3 were done in an opaque way, so as to be careful security-wise. Source 3 and Primary Subsource knew that when they talked, they were talking about the US election issue, but wouldn't necessarily refer to it.

(U//FOUO) is the one who told Primary Subsource that the Russian government was sitting on "kompromat" as stated in paragraph 4.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource attorney stated that it was his client's assessment that this information from Source 3 was credible and accurate. It is Primary Subsource conclusion that the information in paragraph 3 came from his conversation with Source 3

(U//FOUO) rimary Subsource is "inconclusive" about where exactly the information in paragraph 4 came from. He thinks he and Source 3 may have spoken about it - Source 3 is tied to both and Ivanov - but he would not have described Source 3 as "an official close to Ivanov." When asked by interviewers how he Primary Subsource described Source 3 to

Christopher Steele, Primary Subsource said that he described her as "my friend who knows someone in the Kremlin with direct/indirect access to Sergey Ivanov."

#### IV. Dossier Report 2016/134

(U//FOUO) The information in the first paragraph of this report came text interchange with Source 5 in October 2016. (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was less conclusive about the construction of paragraph 2. The final sentence about the lifting of sanctions was taken from Source 5 text in October, but Source 5 never mentioned that Page had been offered any brokerage of the 19% Rosneft stake. There were speculations and "open secrets" about Rosneft and foreign offerings. For example, , an energy analyst and professor [ANALYST NOTE: This appears to be identical to who as of was the of Russia's ] suggested in broad terms to that once sanctions were lifted, Rosneft during the could find itself in a "privileged" state. As an aside, is often dismissed intrinsically as being a remarked that Gazprom lobbyist.

# V. Michael Cohen, Prague and Dossier Reports 2016/135, 2016/136, and 2016/166

(U//FOUO) began his explanation of the Prague and Michael Cohen-related reports by stating that Christopher Steele had given him 4-5 names to research for the election-related tasking. He could only remember three of the names: Carter Page, Paul Manafort and Michael Cohen. When he talked to Source 3 in the fall of 2016 - he believes

it was a phone call - he rattled off these names and, out of them, he was surprised to hear that source immediately [later Primary Subsource softened this to "almost immediately"] recognized Cohen's name.

(U//FOUO) In Report 2016/135, Primary Subsource did not know the origins of paragraph 1. He said that it didn't come from him, and that he doesn't know where the information is from. He described it as "too general."

recognized material from his conversations with Source 3 in the middle of the paragraph. Source 3 had told Primary Subsource that Cohen and three other unidentified people had flown [or, as Primary Subsource put it later, "assumed they had flown"] into Prague in August-September 2016 and had met with a group from Russia. Primary Subsource asked her who else besides Cohen had come into Prague from the US side - she didn't know, but she was willing to go back and find out. She never got back to him about this. Primary Subsource also asked about the participants on the Russian side. She didn't know, but she indicated that her "best guess" or "her understanding" was that they were from "Legal Affairs" or "Legal Department." Primary Subsource indicated that Source 3 did not say why she thought that. Primary Subsource wasn't aware that such an entity existed - he was not able to find it through research.

(U//FOUO) Reflecting on the Prague-related material, Primary Subsource believes he had 1, maybe even 3, conversations with Source 3 on this topic later in October. Nothing on Prague and Cohen was collected during the SIA trip in SIA . The first conversation is the one during which he believes Source 3 noted her recognition of Cohen's name. The second conversation is the one in which she discussed Prague, the visit of Cohen plus three other individuals,

and the meeting with the Russian side. There may have been a third conversation on the topic, but Primary Subsource could not recall exactly and said that they had also talked about "a private subject."

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 2, Primary Subsource doesn't believe he discussed Paul Manafort with Source 3. Source 3 didn't bring up Carter Page or Manafort during these October conversations. The direct quote "...to sweep it all under the carpet..." is from Source 3. Source 3 did not say, however, why Cohen went to Prague instead of Carter Page.

(U//FOUO) In Dossier Report 2016/166, Source 3 is the one who provided the Rossotrudnichestvo information and the identification of Primary Subsource said that during either the second or third conversation with Source 3 about the Cohen matter, Source 3 had initially thought the meetings involved the "legal department" but then identified SIA and Rossotrudnichestvo. Source 3 for information about the identities of the US participants, but she did not know. On the Russian side, Primary Subsource requested that she go back to her sources, and it was after that she came back with the identification of SIA Primary Subsource said that Source 3 never . However, mentioned or said that SIA was working "under Rossotrudnichestvo rimary Subsource had done his own research cover," as is stated in the report. and confirmed that SIA existed.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, Source 3 is the one who mentioned "deniable cash payments" and "wires." Primary Subsource pushed Source 3 for the substance of the meeting in Prague, but he is not sure if Source 3 was brainstorming here, or if she is relating information from her sources.

(U//FOUO) As an aside here, Primary Subsource spoke about some personal details regarding Source 3 . SIA

rimary Subsource reiterated a story from the previous day - Source 3 had just reached out to him the other day to ask him to SIA an article about Russian currently has a visa to come to the speakers and Trump. United States. To questions posed by FBI SA FBI Agent and comments made by his attorney, Primary Subsource indicated that he could carefully Source 3 , perhaps even meet her in a third country. To try and get additional information of interest to the FBI would require in-person conversation, and Primary Subsource quipped that he'd never been SIA said that he had plans to visit her earlier this year SIA , but that it didn't work out. Primary Subsource said that she knew that he had plans to visit her in , because the two of them had talked through the plans. When asked if Source 3 would be comfortable talking to the FBI, said that he wasn't sure.

 $(U//FOUO)^{Primary \, Subsource}$  summarized that, when it comes to the dossier, the Page material regarding Sechin came from Source 5, while the Cohen/Prague material came from Source 3.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 3 of Report 2016/166, Primary Subsource said that he believes that the material "strongly corresponds" to a recent, December 2016 conversation that he had with Source 3. This was a separate, follow-on conversation to the October conversations mentioned before. The material is not word-for-word from his conversation with Source 3, but partially-based on their December 2016 telephone conversation. For example, in their conversation, while he doesn't remember her saying SIA he does recall her saying SIA He recalls that she talked

about SIA "affiliates" but she did not mention the Democratic Party in the way that the report says. As he mentioned earlier, he stated their conversations were held in the overall context of the US elections and hacking, but he is not sure if she mentioned a specific political party or candidate at this time. She did mention "porn traffic" as mentioned in this paragraph. Primary Subsource does not recall Source 3 reference to a specific time frame of March through September 2016.

(U//FOUO) Source 3 did mention both SIA she mentioned - as stated in the report - work "under the FSB." She mentioned SIA and all of his smaller subsidiaries and companies. said that Source 3 SIA which Primary Subsource said was one of SIA companies. admitted to the interviewers that his understanding of this topic (i.e. cyber) was "zero" and that Source 3 is not an IT specialist herself. Source 3 never said that SIA was involved in any of this. He said that paragraph 3 has references and keywords involving payments and cover-up from his conversation with Source 3 .

(U//FOUO) With respect to paragraph 4, Source 3 gave this as a kind of example. She didn't offer any specific information or evidence, but that this (e.g. Romanian hackers heading to Bulgaria to lay low) is a kind of example [ANALYST NOTE: It seemed by Primary Subsource description that this might be Source 3 analysis]. Primary Subsource is not sure where the term "bolt hole" is from, and tried, unsuccessfully, to think about what Russian term this might be representing. When asked if everything in this paragraph came from Source 3, Primary Subsource said that it was difficult to say with certainty. It sounds like material that Source 3 would say. Looking back through the paragraph, Primary Subsource said that

everything before the term "lay low" is definitely from Source 3 while he is not sure about everything after that term. Finally Subsource is not sure about the specifics in this paragraph and agreed with interviewers that the report has more specific language (place names; ethnicity of hackers) than other reports. Interviewers brought up the fact that had mentioned the previous day that Source 3 spoke SIA and had a family vacation home SIA. Primary Subsource did not know if the family home was in SIA, but asked if SIA was "on the coast" because that's where typical family vacation homes were located.

## VI. Source 6 , RIA Novosti, and Dossier Report 2016/95

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked to go back over the reports discussed in brief the previous day regarding his interaction with Source 6.

Primary Subsource said that Christopher Steele had asked him to find sources linked to the Trump team, who could answer the overarching questions regarding Russia's connections to the team, etc. Primary Subsource turned to his contacts at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, and his contacts there told him

Primary Subsource that there was "this guy, Source 6 \_\_\_\_\_\_\_" that he Primary Subsource should talk to.

SIA SIA, who is still around (as rimary Subsource understands) and who is one of rimary Subsource SIA.

SIA SIA, who is still around (as rimary Subsource understands) and who is one of rimary Subsource SIA.

Primary Subsource SIA, and the two of them met over lunch at a Thai restaurant. He didn't want to ask

USPER very targeted or revealing questions for the election assignment, so he kept them broad in scope ("Do you SIA know anyone who can talk about all of this Trump/Manafort stuff, or Trump and Russia?" USPER commented about how there was a great

amount of speculation about Russian influence and Russian ties, but that he was skeptical and nothing substantive had turned up. Primary Subsource should also speak with his colleague, USPER 2 USPER said that "there [is] this interviewed and he USPER 2 could probably get his contact information." Primary Subsource said that he believes, in the end, gave him Primary Subsource Source 6 email, and that he Primary Subsource never met with USPER 2 added that he will see if he still has the email] (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource emailed Source 6 in either June or July 2016 - but Primary Subsource did not it was after Primary Subsource trip SIA receive a response from this email, but says that it was at that point that "things got strange." In July 2016, he received a telephone call from an unidentified Russian guy. He thought it was Source 6 - he still thinks it was Source 6 - but the individual never identified himself as Source 6 . They talked for about 10 minutes, and then arranged to meet together up US City Subsource remembered that they made plans to meet US City (U//FOUO) offered to come up "anytime" Source 6 was available. and that Source 6 wouldn't commit to a specific time, but Primary Subsource said that he "for a couple of days." could not recall if Source 6 said he lived US City or not, but Primary Subsource that he did. Following this,

traveled US City with prepared questions, but Source 6 was a no-show. The

visit would have been near the end of July. Later,

asking about himPrimary Subsource USPER 2

"who the hell you

, who mentioned to Primary Subsource

mmary Subsource spoke with

that Source 6 had been

said that Source 6

rimary Subsource were" and that it would be

USPER 2

hard to reach out to him Source 6 now because he was in SIA Primary Subsource remembers providing Christopher Steele with the information about Source 6 whereabouts in SIA tried one more follow-up with Source 6 in September 2016. He decided to use his friend from SIA involved in . She has a Primary Subsource project, so, knowing that Source 6 SIA him a brochure about SIA project in the hope that it would generate a response. Source 6 never responded. At some point, Source 6 and Primary Subsource became SIA but could not remember which of them initiated the SIA

(U//FOUO) Altogether, Primary Subsource and the person he believed - and still believes - to be Source 6 had one 10-15 minute conversation. Primary Subsource says that "Source E" in Report 2016/95 sounds like it is from this conversation. During the phone call, he remembers mentioning Manafort and Page. Primary Subsource recalls that this 10-15 minute conversation included a general discussion about Trump and the Kremlin, that there was "communication" between the parties, and that it was an ongoing relationship. Primary Subsource recalls that the individual believed to be Source 6 said that there was "exchange of information" between Trump and the Kremlin, and that there was "nothing bad about it." Source 6 said that some of this information exchange could be good for Russia, and some could be damaging to Trump, but deniable. The individual said that the Kremlin might be of help to get Trump elected, but Primary Subsource did not recall any discussion or mention of Wikileaks.

(U//FOUO) Besides the 10-15 minute conversation,  $\frac{\text{Primary Subsource}}{\text{Further contact with}}$  had no further contact with  $\frac{\text{Source 6}}{\text{Source 6}}$  (or the person he believed to be  $\frac{\text{Source 6}}{\text{Source 6}}$ ).

#### VI. Trump, the Ritz Carlton and Dossier Report 2016/80

(U//FOUO) The interviewers brought Primary Subsource attention to the report regarding Trump's alleged unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz Carlton Hotel - specifically paragraph 3 of Report 2016/80. Primary Subsource said that this information came, partially, from Source 2 circle of associates and friends, Primary Subsource explained once more, is primarily in the SIA sphere, but his social network is vast, and he has other, random associates. In fact, as another example, Source 2 travels to SIA SIA (U//FOUO) When Primary Subsource asked Source 2 in early June 2016 (the SIA ) about whether he knew of any compromising materials on Trump, Source 2 said that there was a "well known story" about Trump's activities in the very hotel SIA the Ritz Carlton. SIA to make preparations for the SIA event. The "well known story" involved the allegation that Trump was "into water sports" and had engaged in that activity "in the presidential suite" at the Ritz Carlton. In terms of whether the story was true, Source 2 that people "know" but that it "only becomes fact if people come forward." Source 2 said that the hotel is bugged, and "heaven only knows" who or what has been filmed by the FSB. Source 2 said to Primary SubsourceSIA Go and check out the story." SIA mmary Subsource explained it, the fact of hotel bugging and the (U//FOUO) As

use of filmed "kompromat" is not uncommon. Primary Subsource related the names of those who have been targeted in this way - [Yuriy] Skuratov, [Mikhail] Kasyanov, and Vladimir Rushkov [unclear, maybe Ryzhkov].

Primary Subsource has also been able to comment on hotel bugging because it is generally known, as he explained to interviewers, that if you want to visit Moscow and not be vulnerable to being bugged, you have to stay away from the Ritz Carlton, the Hotel Moskva, and the Hotel Peking.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph 4 in Report 2016/80, SIA

, he had a meeting with the managers SIA

. During a free minute, he asked about "this stuff about Trump at the hotel." His interlocutors laughed it off, stating that "all kinds of things happen at the hotel" and with celebrities, "one never knows what they're doing." Primary Subsource said that it wasn't a denial. And asking the hotel staff who were assisting with the SIA arrangements, one girl commented that "anything goes" at the hotel, and added that, "officially, we don't have prostitutes."

(U//FOUO) For this story, Christopher Steele was given the names of the management at the Ritz Carlton. Primary Subsource said that he reported Trump's unorthodox sexual activity at the Ritz as "rumor and speculation" and that he had not been able to confirm the story.

(U//FOUO) In the same report, paragraphs 1, 4 and 5, identified "Source B" as Former Russian Intelligence through Source 1.

Source 1 reported that he and had "had a conversation" about the content in the report. said that they had "embarrassing stuff- sexual/pornographic material" on a number of folks, "including Trump."

ability to blackmail Trump was "logical conclusion" rather than reporting. The conversation with Source 1 took place in June 2016 at

SIA - the particular café near the

SIA - the particular café near the

SIA - the particular café near the

Subsource subsource said that the mention of the file in paragraph 5 was part of a conversation between and Source 1 , but Primary Subsource has no idea where the mention of "Department K of the FSB" is from. He does not recall hearing that, or mentioning that to Christopher Steele.

Additionally, the years over which the "kompromat" file was collected were also never mentioned, to Primary Subsource recollection.

### 26 January 2017

#### FBI Washington Field Office Interview Room

#### Present:

, interviewee's attorney

, interviewee's attorney

, FBI Special Agent

, FBI Supervisory Intelligence Analyst

, Deputy, National Security Division, US Department of Justice

## I. Recent Communication by Orbis Representative; Overall Wellbeing

and his attorney related that Chris Steele had (U//FOUO) Subsource this morning. One of Steele's associates at "signaled" to - an analyst who Primary Subsource said he has Orbis, seen approximately 12 times - called Primary Subsource remarked that "had been lying too low." said that "[Orbis] hadn't heard from him over the past 10 days, and that they wanted to know what was going on." Primary Subsource told that he'd been staying in a hotel place SIA and at his SIA , and that he had been talking to an attorney about his SIA

Primary Subsource did not speak with Steele during this conversation. that Steele was still "lying low" but that heard from "everyone" was concerned about Primary Subsource wellbeing. [ANALYST NOTE: The attorney commented that the fact reached out is yet another indication of how his client was put through the recruitment cycle initially recruited by Chris Steele, but passed off to underlings for Primary Subsource discussed some possible and day-to-day management.] future assignments - "small due diligence assignments unrelated to politics" - and indicated that they would run stuff by him if something came up - but [and it was not clear if this was actual comment or Primary Subsource reflection] probably not much in the area of Russia. There was talk about wiring past due monies for Primary Subsource to Primary Subsource added, there was also discussion about . or, getting him money through "someone we know [in the United States]" was hesitant about arranging payments in any way that "looked strange."

(U//FOUO) told Finary Subsource that since the Buzzfeed story hit the news, Orbis has received 20,000 emails.

(U//FOUO) No one from SIA has reached out to check on Primary Subsource welfare. That said, Primary Subsource typically works from his home. He works off-hours, given the time difference between SIA Moscow and London. There is space and some desks he can use at SIA , but most of his work is done at home.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource commented that, unless his name goes public, he is fine when it comes to his source network. He doesn't believe he can travel SIA - he feels that he would be in danger and, as he put it, SIA

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource indicated that Orbis does know the identities of some of his sources - they have some first and last names. For example, Orbis knows the identity of Source 2 , who, Primary Subsource added, SIA

(U//FOUO) rimary Subsource said that he had gone back to check for electronic communication records, but he said that he had deleted most of the election-related communications "months ago." He also has a different phone from the one he used previously. He didn't delete communication involving USPER 2 [see previous day's interview], and he had reported that communication to Christopher Steele.

#### (U//FOUO) Dossier Report 2016/86

(U//FOUO) was asked a number of questions regarding the sourcing and information about the FSB cyber-related dossier report.

(U//FOUO) In paragraph 1, the "former senior intelligence officer" is

Former Russian Intelligence , through Source 1 . Source 1 told this

Officer information directly to Subsource in SIA at the SIA

café.

(U//FOUO) Some of the material in paragraph 2 was not familiar to Primary Subsource. In general, the material tracks with comments made to primary Subsource by Source 2, with corroboration via open source material. Looking more over the paragraph, Primary Subsource said that the Source 2 material begins with the sentence, "To compensate for this shortfall..." Primary Subsource does not recall using the terms "first tier" (in the first sentence) in his reports to Steele - he is not sure that information came from him Primary Subsource.

(U//FOUO) The material in paragraph 3 could be referencing material gleaned from one of Primary SubsourceSIA friends from SIA years old, Friend . When he was SIA was caught "facilitating payments for a pornographic website." He was offered a deal - cooperate with the FSB or potentially go to jail. He ended up doing some work for the FSB, but Primary Subsource doesn't know what type of did for the FSB [ANALYST NOTE: This is in contradiction to Primary Subsource statement the first day, at which time he indicated that he did not have any contacts associated with the Russian intelligence and security services.] Friend is a couple of years younger than rimary Subsource, and he Friend returned to "normal life" [that is, post FSB activity] around SIA told knew of many other people who have been put in a similar situation [with the FSB]. Presently, Friend works in SIA ; however, Primary Subsource is unclear for whom - he thought that Friend might be working for SIA for the banking industry, and/or doing something in the way of SIA asked if Primary Subsource would consider Friend a "contractor, said "yes, like myself, but in a different [sector]."

(U//FOUO) In the same paragraph - paragraph 3 - the portion that begins with "In one case a US citizen..." was derived from a conversation with

Source 1 related this story, indicating that the US citizen was Source 1 friend who does work with "educational apps or something."

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 4, finary Subsource could not attribute it to any source in particular. The "foreign director of a company," recalled primary Subsource, is a foreign director on the board of SIA, but he did know the exact identity.

(U//FOUO) For paragraph 5, Primary Subsource said that some of the information came from his discussions with the Russian SIA , Russian contact - who, Primary Subsource reiterated, SIA [SIA]

Primary Subsource said that "an FSB cyber operative" is an incorrect

source characterization and that Russian had mentioned to him contact

Primary Subsource that Telegram had been compromised.

(U//FOUO) Regarding paragraph  $\varepsilon$ , Primary Subsource could not attribute it conclusively to any particular source. He said that he can't confirm it, but he believes the source may have been Source 2. Some of it is open source, however.

# (U//FOUO) General Summarizing about Primary Subsource Sources

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Primary Subsource if, generally speaking about the dossier as a whole, the mentions of Dmitriy Peskov [Putin's press secretary] and Sergey Ivanov can be typically sourced to Source 3.

Primary Subsource said yes - Source 3 has direct and indirect contact with a deputy, or multiple deputies, in SIA. As stated earlier,

she is also tied into SIA SIA . Primary Subsource said that, through Source 3 , he could try and get the names and the deputies and assistants she uses for getting her information.

(U//FOUO) When it comes to any material on SIA Source 2 is the primary source. is friends with Russian official Source 2 related a story from circa 2015-2016. For a different assignment, got Source 2 to talk to the SIA . During that interaction, the SIA indicated that power and authority when it came to press relations had centralized on Peskov. Source 2 friend indicated that "[we're] all under Peskov now," which took to mean that authority within the Presidential Administration's PR/GR circles had entered a pyramid-type stage with Peskov at the top of the pyramid.

(U//FOUO) On the material regarding the replacement of Sergey Ivanov with Anton Vaino, this was also derived from Source 3, as well as "two other friends" [which Primary Subsource left vague and didn't identify]. The part of the reports connecting Ivanov's replacement by Vaino to the fallout over Russia's influence efforts against the US election was, according to Primary Subsource, his analytical conclusion. Source 3 "confirmed that it had to be true," said Primary Subsource. Source 3 told him something like "[Ivanov's dismissal because of US-election related fallout] just had to be true" or else she said something like "Of course, it has to be that..."

# (U//FOUO) General Summarizing of Primary Subsource Debriefings by Orbis

(U//FOUO) The interviewers asked Primary Subsource about how Christopher Steele would go about debriefing him after his visits, specifically about how

Steele asked him about distinguishing between what his sources have told him versus his Primary Subsource analytical judgments. Primary Subsource said that Steele would often ask him, "Are you sure [about what your source is telling you," and sometimes would repeatedly press him about a certain report - emphasizing "Are you Primary Subsource sure? Are you sure?" Primary Subsource said that he Primary Subsource was very careful about caveating during debriefs with Steele. He would tell Steele if something was his analytical judgment ("As an analyst, I think..."), explain his confidence levels ("It is possible vs. likely" or "It is plausible"), and even tell Steele whether something had just not been explicitly denied ("No one has denied it when I've brought it up."). At times he would tell Steele that "I've told you what I know." When pressed by Steele to try to get additional information, Primary Subsource would explain that he did not want to go back to his friends "3 or 4 times" to try to get additional material - it would look bad and it would raise suspicions. Steele might ask, for example, "Do any of your Primary Subsource sources know if Ivanov was sacked because of the US presidential election?"

(U//FOUO) Not wanting to cause suspicions with friends and associates, primary Subsource would try and corroborate the reporting he received in other ways. The interviewers also asked if primary Subsource would characterize his sources to Steele ( $^{\text{Source 3}}$  told me X" or  $^{\text{Source 1}}$  told me Y"). Primary Subsource said that was not always the case.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource said that his verbal debriefings with Christopher Steele were held at Orbis' office, not at hotels. Steele would debrief solo, and would take handwritten notes of what Primary Subsource was telling him. Primary Subsource remarked that it [Steele taking handwritten notes] was just like "you [the FBI interviewers] are doing today."

(U//FOUO) Going back over his note-taking, Primary Subsource said that he would not really write detailed notes about his source meetings. Even on the SIA SIA flight, returning from trips, he might scratch out a few tentative points - i.e. "5 days, 17 meetings" - and maybe some cryptic reminders. He might also write a text message to himself, but he compared it to preparation to a conference panel presentation -- a few notes jotted on a notecard before one heads to the panel. He told the interviewers that he had destroyed any of these scribbled notes.

or phone. Primary Subsource said it was a combination of these things.

Primary Subsource described the US election-related tasking came in three waves: (1) the initial tasking about Paul Manafort; (2) the tasking about any compromising materials on Donald Trump; (3) tasking about Sergey Ivanov's involvement in the US election; and (4) later on, in the fall of 2016, 4-5 names to ask about [which Primary Subsource talked about earlier, including Carter Page and Michael Cohen].

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked if Steele had ever mentioned going to the press about with the election-related information. To Primary Subsource knowledge, Steele never went to the press about this material.

Primary Subsource never heard Steele voice anything suggesting that this material needed to get into the hands of the press.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked if he was tasked with anything else similar to what was in the dossier, but does not appear in the dossier. He said no, and repeated that these types of taskings [on the election matter] made him uncomfortable. Steele pushed Primary Subsource to try and either follow-up with people or corroborate the reporting, but Primary Subsource wasn't able to do so. Moreover, Primary Subsource added, attempts at

getting corroboration on these subjects made him uncomfortable - he was very nervous about the Russians finding out about it.

(U//FOUO) The interviewers later asked Primary Subsource to review his annotated version of the dossier, asking specifically if there were any additional source names that had not been covered in the 3-day interview.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource said that he did not have any UK-based friends or social network connections from whom he collects information.



(U//FOUO) SIA 2016

(U//FOUO) The SIA 2016 trip was completely paid by Orbis.

(U//FOUO) SIA 2016

(U//FOUO) He remarked that the SIA trip was "odd," explaining that, upon entry, he was interviewed more pointedly than usual. This was the only time it has happened. For about five minutes, he was peppered with questions and statements like, "What exactly are you planning to do here? Who are you visiting? Your photo looks different." Primary Subsource kept his answers vague - he said he was visiting his SIA

. All the while, his questioners at entry were checking on the computer. He reported this incident to Steele.

Interview of Primary Subsource Title: , 02/09/2017 (U//FOUO) Going back over the SIA trip, the interviewers asked if he made it up to SIA , particularly since some of the material in the dossier mentions SIA . He did travel to . He went for a "private weekend" to SIA that had from SIA nothing to do with work. He flew SIA Primary Subsource said that none of the material in the dossier was derived from his weekend trip to SIA (U//FOUO) The SIA trip was completely paid by Orbis. (U//FOUO) 2016 (U//FOUO) What alarmed Primary Subsource most about his SIA 2016 visit was "how perfectly it all went." Nothing bad happened. There were a number of events for which he was the facilitator. He had to make sure people were where they were supposed to be, and he also gave a SIA but it went off without a hitch. (U//FOUO) During the SIA trip, gave a brief presentation to the delegation SIA was one of 3-4 speakers during a set of talks SIA is the only person during this trip whose name made it into the dossier; however, the material on was not derived from the SIA trip. did not spend any time with during the SIA said that he saw Source 4 trip. Primary Subsource , and "SIA Source 2 did not collect anything on the SIA trip.

49

(U//FOUO) Steele debriefed Primary Subsource after the SIA trip. Nothing specific was provided; he and Steele just had "ongoing conversations" about the general situation. Orbis contributed to the costs of the SIA trip, but the trip was paid by SIA. It was during this layover period in London that Primary Subsource received the text confirming Page's meeting with Sechin.

## (U//FOUO) SIA 2016

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource traveled to the UK at the end of SIA 2016. The trip was jointly financed by Orbis and Primary Subsource himself. He met with Steele, but most of the rest of Orbis staff was on a retreat in Dublin. He and Steele went out, had a glass of champagne, and had only general conversations. There was no discussion of the election, and no discussion of the election-related project.

## (U//FOUO) St. Petersburg & Dossier Report 2016/112

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource explained that the overall subject of this report - Govorun, Alfa Bank - has been a topic he Primary Subsource has been working for over ten years. It hearkens back to his time SIA with USPER , where they would hypothesize about relationships between Russian corruption and the Alfa Fellowship.

wherein Source 1 told Primary Subsource that [someone had told him] about how Marat Bashirov, who had been head of the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR) and has been sanctioned by the EU, left the LPR after 5-6 months to become a top lobbyist for Renova Group - specifically Renova's arm dealing with heating and power distribution. Bashirov is a Moscow-based lobbyist who is working to get the EU sanctions lifted.

#### (U//FOUO) St. Petersburg-Related Information

(U//FOUO) The material regarding St. Petersburg and Trump real estate deals came from  $\begin{array}{c} \text{Source 2} \end{array}$ . Source  $\begin{array}{c} \text{Source 2} \end{array}$  suggested that one person to look at regarding compromising material on Trump was [Aras] Agalarov, as well as  $\begin{array}{c} \text{SIA} \end{array}$ , one of the biggest real estate developers.

imany Subsource also talked to a friend of his who [ANALY (U//FOUO) ST NOTE: either had or knew someone who had] escorted Trump while in St. Petersburg. Friend , who he knew as a in SIA , was a SIA who lived in Moscow. She was about SIA years old when she died, suddenly, last SIA . heard the news from her boyfriend, who sent him a picture of her gravesite. She wrote stories which were on the critical side of the Russian government. SIA . He saw her in Russia 2013 SIA during a project circa adding that it was about  $\epsilon$ -7 months before the 2015 at a Olympics. He also saw her in get-together SIA . He said she was also

# (U//FOUO) Reactions of Primary Subsource Friends to the Dossier

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource has had friends reach out to him about Trump and the dossier. He's considered it normal joking - SIA

He simply jokes back. None of his friends or social network has broken off contact because of the election or the release of the dossier.

#### (U//FOUO) Friends' Travel to the United States; Approachability

(U//FOUO) Source 3

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked if he'd ever met Source 3 in the United States. Primary Subsource said that he met Source 3 in the United States during her visit in SIA 2016. She had a trip to a number of destinations in the United States, and she stopped over in SIA . She, Primary Subsource, and SIA , went shopping and to a restaurant together. Primary Subsource said that she came out for her SIA . He doesn't know exactly where she visited while in the United States, but he thought it was SIA

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource believes that Source 3 had also traveled previously to the United States - perhaps as many as SIA times. He knows that she was on a SIA visiting SIA in the mid-2000s. She has stayed at hotels, as well as at Primary Subsource place.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource is not sure if Source 3 would talk to the FBI. He can't speak for her. He said that she is in a SIA right now

[SIA ]. Primary Subsource thinks if Source 3 received a plausible job offer, she might come over. Primary Subsource offered that he could carefully inquire about her plans over the coming year (2017) and see if there are possibilities - he reiterated that he owes source 3 an SIA over the next few days about the views of Russian speakers in the United States towards Trump.

Interview of Primary Subsource 02/09/2017 (U//FOUO) Source 4 has not been to the United States in probably SIA (U//FOUO) vears. (U//FOUC) Source 1 traveled to the United States in circa SIA (U//FOUO) met him in the United States. reiteratedSource 1 ties with (U//FOUO)has occasional travel to Europe and Southeast Asia (U//FOUO) . She would probably be willing to travel to the United States; reiterated that she reportedly has "senior and SIA connections" in SIA . Off-handedly, said that has her own "kurator" [handler] but when interviewers pressed him on this point, he softened that statement, indicating that "projects an image that she has these types of [secret] connections" and "knows the [intelligence] lingo." He never reported to Steele that Source 5 had a "kurator." Contacts with Russian Intelligence and Security (U//FOUO) and SIA Services [Redux]; (U//FOUO) Given his language ability and his overseas travel as an Primary Subsource was asked if he had ever been approached by student, Russian intelligence and/or security services when he was a student in said no. The only individuals with whom he has contact who were connected to Russia's intelligence and security services were

(1) his friend, Friend, who worked for the FSB in order to stay out of jail SIA, (2) Russian official, the SIA in SIA who mentioned in the previous interview; and (3) FNU Russian journalist, who interacted with him and USPER in SIA. Russian journalist and would pester and would pester and USPER for information. [ANALYST NOTE: This contradicted Primary Subsource earlier statements regarding having no contact with Russia's intelligence and security services, and it also contradicted his earlier statements regarding not really knowing if Russian was actually connected to Russia's intelligence and security services.]



also related a story regarding Source 2 rimary Subsource said that he remembered this story interaction with the FSB. "right before I talked to you [the FBI] this week." Circa SIA was SIA told him about this, and also SIA a picture of the doors at . At FSBHQ, Source 2 SIA was questioned SIA Source 2 had made about the leadership Source 2 of Russia's SIA was also lightly threatened. According to Primary Subsource , he Source 2 was told that "he Source 2 Source 2 should be more careful; that he should watch his mouth and act responsibly." Source 2 ended up SIA about this interaction, and received a lot of joking about SIA

(U//FOUO) primary Subsource brushed aside the idea of being approached by the intelligence and security services as a student. He explained that it was the late SIA , and the university setting was rather lax. He did not really attend class all that often because his language was already good and the classes weren't that useful. People smoked in class and dressed down.

## (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource and Russia's Diplomatic Corps

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource was asked if he had ever considered a career with Russia's diplomatic corps. Primary Subsource explained that he went to a SIA for SIA , which he identified as SIA Most of the graduates were told, SIA , for example, that they were slated for big things in life and would be aimed towards university at SIA , SIA , or SIA , with future careers in diplomacy, interpretation or "going abroad." SI years later, Primary Subsource remarked, probably is of the students are abroad, in places like London and elsewhere.

(U//FOUO) Primary Subsource told the interviewers that he never seriously considered going into the diplomatic corps. He never tested for it, and he never applied for any of the major universities listed above [which would feed into Russia's diplomatic corps].

# (U//FOUO) Additional Primary Subsource Contacts from SIA

(U//FOUO) remary subsource was asked if - beside Source 3 and others he has mentioned - if he has used other old friendships, schoolmates, and known associates from SIA as sources of information. Primary Subsource balked, meandered in the conversation, and did not really answer the question. The interviewers did not press him on this at this point.

# (U//FOUO) Primary Subsource Contacts in Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

(U//FOUO) was asked about his contacts in the MFA. He remarked that, over the years, he has collected numerous business cards of MFA personnel, usually through contact at conferences and events. He met Yuriy Ushakov a few times SIA — and remarked how Ushakov is known to operate "independent" of Lavrov. Primary Subsource also met Sergey Kislyak at a couple of events - he recalled one event that happened on his SIA .

Primary Subsource whispered out (U//FOUO) After thinking about it a bit more, " The interviewers asked him for additional loud to himself, details. Primary Subsource could not remember the individual's surname at " was from<mark>SIA</mark> first. He said that , and that he "strange character" met last year. He met background was in PR/GR with the SIA , and then took a career with the MFA. Pavel studied MFA job as "a delivery boy" but added that it was strange because "did not seem to be qualified for the job that he had [at the MFA]." Eventually, recalled that surname was Surname

