Document Links
Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00050 (FISA Ct. 2009) (Hogan, J.)
[Almost entirely consistent language and redactions to GID.C.00051 ( https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052745 ), but with some slight differences]
Holding that the targeting and minimization procedures used in this case are consistent with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§1881a(d)-(e) and with the Fourth Amendment, and granting authorization to use them. However, recognizing that continued NSA noncompliance problems “principally involve analysts improperly acquiring the communications of U.S. persons, suggesting that the CIA problem is “arguably more troubling because it reflects a profound misunderstanding of minimization procedures,” recognizing that the government’s practice (unbeknownst to the Court) had been to report only certain noncompliance incidents and not others (such as failure to de-task accounts even after NSA learned that the targets entered the U.S.), and noting that the government must report to the Court every compliance incident that relates to the operation of the targeting or minimization procedures.